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Abstract
Advocates of the competitive market paradigm strongly believe that “getting the price right”
would improve manufacturing performance. Australia experienced extensive trade reforms in
the late 1980s and 1990s which were expected to promote a competitive manufacturing
sector. This paper examines whether these trade reforms have had a positive impact on the
growth performance of the manufacturing sector. Selected growth performance variables-
labour productivity, price-cost margins and exports - were regressed on change in
protection variables. The results of the study are consistent with the hypothesis that trade
reforms have increased the growth performance of the manufacturing sector.
Key Words: Trade Reform, Performance, Industry, Australia
Introduction
1
The recent developments in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) towards a more outward looking response to a
changing world environment accelerated the need for the removal of protection in a planned
manner. As a response, protectionism to unilateral liberalisation and participation in regional
trade liberalisation are the recent trade policy focus in Australia. One of the policy goals is to
promote a competitive manufacturing sector.
Findings on the role of foreign trade reforms on productivity growth in Australia tend to
show positive results (Dixon and McDonald, 1991; Industry Commission 1997; Oczkowski
and Sharma, 1999). This paper tries to add to the debate on the effects of recent trade
reforms on not only productivity growth but also on export growth and changes in price-cost
margins. These indicators of performance are estimated at the 4-digit manufacturing
branches as a whole and textiles, clothing and footwear (TCF) and passenger motor
vehicles (PMV) separately. Recently, TCF and PMV industries experienced extensive
liberalisation. A set of indicators of trade liberalisation in combination with branch structure
and technology variables is used to explain change in performance in a cross-sectional
regression model. We conduct the analysis over two alternative periods 1989/90 to
1992/93 and 1989/90 to 1996/97.2
The first section of the paper discusses the possible links between trade reforms and
performance. The second section reveals trade policy in Australia, focusing before and after
1988; it also reports the result of protection and trade efficiency studies for Australia. The
third section considers the methodology used in this study. The fourth section reports the
result of cross-sectional regression analysis on two different sets of data 1989/90-1992/93
and 1989/90-1996/97. The last section draws conclusions.
Trade Policy and Performance
The expectation of removal of protection is to generate industrial efficiency by eliminating
allocative distortions in line with competitive comparative advantage, lower "x-inefficiency"
by exposure to foreign competition, and higher long-run rate of growth by exposure to
greater technical change and by access to long-run economies of scale in an open
environment.
Empirical studies that have revealed the relationship between trade reforms and performance
have tended to use productivity growth, export growth and changes in price-cost margins as
yardsticks of performance measures. Productivity measures capture efficiency in input use.
Exporting is likely to reflect international competitiveness. The price-cost margins reflect the
extent to which domestic producers can price monopolistically ( Havrylyshyn, 1990;
Kirkpatrick and Maharaj, 1992; Jayanthakumaran, 1996/97).
Three approaches have been used to capture trade effects in empirical analysis: static
efficiency measures for individual countries; comparison of the performance before and after
reforms; and of reformers and non-reformers by using cross-country studies and detailed
country case studies.
Static measures generally indicate unanticipated effective protection and profit incentives to
the sectors concerned and a shelter to high-cost producers especially in the developing
countries (Weiss 1990). Before and after liberalisation (or trade policy reformers and non-
reformers) studies indicate that the stronger and speedier the liberalisation, the greater the
manufacturing output and export growth
2. One should be careful interpreting the results,
mainly because there is no evidence showing that it is  liberalisation which causes this
improvement.
Three types of studies have been used linking trade policy and performance; first,
regressions which pooled a sample of countries with differences in trade policies at different
periods; secondly, regressions based on individual countries, by type of economic policy
(i.e, more open or less open); finally regressions of plant level data of a number of countries.3
The cross-country regressions seem to be sensitive to slight alterations in the policy variables
and to small changes in the sample of countries chosen and to a choice of time period
reflecting the stage of the business cycle.
A number of recent detailed country studies using market Structure-Conduct-Performance
analysis (S-C-P) tend to shed some light for the belief that trade reforms generate short-run
positive efficiency gains leaving scepticism over long-run effects. The majority of studies
indicated a short-term positive productivity growth due to trade reforms. There are strong
reasons to believe that the degree of concentration will reduce with the opening to
international trade. However, some empirical studies show that opening to trade increases
the collusive agreements between domestic firms and this may enhance price markups (De
Melo and Urata,1984). Available studies indicate that trade reforms have a positive impact
on manufacturing exports due to an increase in price competitiveness. Further work on these
lines may lead to firmer conclusions on the effects of liberalisation
3.
Trade Policy Reforms in Australia
For most of the period from 1968/69 to 1988/89, Australian trade policy has targeted
reduced controls on foreign trade. However, partly as a response to balance of payments
difficulties and partly as a response to protect passenger motor vehicles (PMV), textiles,
clothing and footwear (TCF) from import competition, this was not entirely implemented.
PMV and TCF branches have received both tariff and non-tariff incentives throughout. The
attempt to eliminate non-tariff barriers in PMV and TCF branches in 1988 and 1993
respectively and to reduce tariff barriers over time from 1988, has been described as a
major breakthrough in liberalisation (Industry Commission 1995). Unlike the former trade
reforms, the present one is associated with greater macro-economic stability, radical micro-
economic reforms and greater external stability.
The Australian manufacturing industry as a whole has undergone substantial declines in
government assistance between 1968/69 to 1988/89. A 25 per cent uniform tariff cut was
imposed in 1973. The macro-economic imbalances, especially the rise in wage rates and
interest rate in real terms, that occurred right after the removal of tariffs made the
government reverse its decision and embark on a quota system once again. During 1972/73
due to a commodity price boom and capital inflow, the balance of payments went into
surplus and led to monetary expansion and currency appreciation. The currency
appreciation in turn led to a deteriorating current account and recession in 1974/75.
The introduction of quantitative import restrictions to a number of sectors including PMV
and TCF in 1974/75, and increased level of tariffs in these sectors, was quite obviously4
inconsistent to the original trade reform program. Although the quotas applying to other
sectors were removed soon after, the quotas for PMV and TCF remained until the early
1990s. In addition, PMV and TCF received favourable treatment throughout on the basis
that these industries were uncompetitive and needed support. PMV has received export
facilitation in 1984 under which producers are allowed to import a certain percentage of
their total value of production duty free. This percentage varied overtime. TCF has received
Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) between 1974-77. Anderson (1995) concluded that:
overall the PMV industry has been governed by a complex range of government policies;
the labour intensive TCF industry has experienced a comparative disadvantage; and both
industries generated costs in relation to benefits.
Tariff reductions in 1977 were introduced as a response to the devaluation of the Australian
dollar in November 1976. The expectation was to minimise adverse effects on local
industries, and involved the removal of unused assistance from low-cost industries (Industry
Commission, 1995). Relatively stable macro-economic conditions, with a low inflation rate
of about 8 per cent compared to 15 per cent in 1975, was a favourable condition at this
stage.
The sudden investment slump and recession with another wage explosion that followed in
the early 1980s, reduced the benefits that could have accrued through trade reforms. In the
meantime, the Australian dollar rose about 50 per cent in real terms between 1981-85 and
the terms of trade worsened due to a collapse in commodity prices. The external
uncertainties finally led the government to float the Australian dollar in 1983 (Corden, 1997).
Keating and Dixon (1989) mentioned that the current account deficit, which averaged 4.8
per cent of GDP over the 6 years to 1985/6, was more or less explained not only by
macro-economic conditions such as huge public sector borrowing, overseas borrowing that
generated inadequate returns but also a lack of competitiveness in domestic industries partly
reflecting wage/price inflation and structural rigidities.
The terms of trade improved due to an increase in commodity prices by the mid 1980s. In
addition, two major changes occurred on the micro-economic front: one was financial
deregulation in the areas of free entry, removal of controls in lending rates and removals of
restrictions on bank portfolios; the other one was to reduce real wage rates, due to the
wage-price agreement between the government and the major trade union organisation
(ACTU), which remained as a major obstacle to competitiveness in the manufacturing sector
since the early 1970s.
As a result of these policies, the average Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) for the5
manufacturing sector dropped from 35 per cent in 1971 to 15 per cent in 1988/89. Among
the various sectors, TCF and PMV  received the highest ERP of about 113 per cent and 52
per cent respectively even in 1988 (Industry Commission, 1995).
The radical trade reform process began in 1988 following the realisation that the expanded
exports of manufacturing were essential to the prosperity of that sector, and the realisation
that expanded protection in an interdependent sector/economy would support only a single
manufacturing industry at the expense of other manufacturing, agricultural and mining
industries. As Keating and Dixon (1989), at this stage, pointed out Australia intended to
target industries that were internationally competitive, export-oriented and capable of lasting
a long-time with a minimum level of assistance.
A  general program of phased reductions in nominal tariffs for most imports except PMV
and TCF was announced in 1988. Initially, tariffs above 15 per cent were expected to be
lowered to 15 per cent. Then tariffs between 15 per cent and 10 per cent to be lowered to
10 per cent by 1992. Further, a 2 per cent revenue duty on imports was removed. Trade
reforms continued throughout the 1990s in goods and services as well. Reforms occurred in
anti-dumping and countervailing duty, export finance and quarantine and inspection services
in 1996/97 (Industry Commission 1996/97). By this time Dixon and McDonald (1993)
noted rapid changes in the Australian economy between 1986/87 and 1990/91; a 30 per
cent appreciation in the real exchange rate following the improvement in the terms of trade,
an increase in the capital/labour ratio following the improvement in investment, more exports
of non-traditional manufacturing products and a general increase in imports. A brief
recession and job losses in the early 1990s did not stop further implementation of the
program.
Import restriction by quota was no longer available to the manufacturing sector, terminating
for PMV in 1988 and TCF in 1993. Tariffs protecting these two industries were the only
instrumentality of protection and tariff rates were substantially reduced in 1991. The Industry
Commission (1995) estimated that the nominal tariff rates will be 15 per cent and 25 per
cent for PMV and TCF respectively by the year 2000.
In addition to stable economic conditions with low inflation and low interest rates, intensive
micro-economic reforms were initiated during the mid 1990s aimed at enhancing the
aggregated benefits from trade reform. The current Coalition Government is committed to
more efficient infrastructure services, more flexible labour market, more advanced taxation
system, less red tape and access to competitively priced goods and services
4. The major
trade reform program that was initiated in 1988 was consistent and pursued even through6
the country received a devastating currency depreciation and was on the brink of recession
due to the Asian financial crisis by 1998/99. The effects of the trade reforms on the
performance of domestic producers are discussed below.
Table 1: Aggregate Indicators of Trade Reform: Australia
1989/90 1992/3 1996/7
Effective Rates of Protection* (%) 15 12 6
Net subsidy equivalent* ($ mil) 10230 7683 4001
Manufacturing gross product index (at constant 1989/90
prices)*
100 97.4 108.9
Branch tariffs as a % of imports (at constant 1989/90
prices)**
8.72 6.39 4.22
Manufacturing trade balance as a % of GDP** -6.3 -4.6 -5.0
Source: * Industry Commission 1995 and Reserve Bank 1998
** computed
Table 1 shows that Effective Rates of Protection (ERP) were reduced from 15 per cent to 6
per cent between 1988/89 and 1996/97. These reductions in effective protection resulted in
a reduction in a net subsidy equivalent to $10.2 million in 1988/89 to $4 million in 1996/97.
In other words, an estimate of the amount of money which would have to be paid by way of
subsidy to assist the manufacturing sector to the same extent as the effective rate of
protection has been reduced by $6 million. As a result of reductions in tariff rates,
government revenue from tariffs at the branch level as a ratio of imports has been reduced to
4.22 per cent in 1996/97 compared to 8.72 per cent in 1988/89.
In 1998, the manufacturing sector contributed 14 per cent of GDP and 13 per cent of
employment. There were positive performances in productivity growth in this sector; the
Industry Commission (1997) estimated annual total factor productivity growth as 0.75 and
labour productivity growth as 0.53 between 1988-95;  Oczkowski and Sharma (1999)
estimated annual growth in total factor productivity ranged from 0.2 to 2.8 per cent. Dixon
and McDonald (1991) estimated annual labour productivity growth as 1.59 per cent
between 1979/80 to 1989/90. The trade balance among the manufacturing branches as a
percentage of GDP has been reduced from - 6.3 in 1989/90 to -5.0 in 1996/97 mainly as a
result of improvements in exports. However, the manufacturing sector’s share in terms of
GDP is still low compared to OECD countries.
The Methodology
To test the hypothesis that trade reforms have had a positive impact on performance in7
manufacturing, a formal Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) cross-sectional regression model
was estimated:
GP = f (TEC, STR, CTP)
where GP indicates growth performance variables and TEC, STR and CTP indicate
technology variables, structural variables and change in trade policy variables respectively.
We estimate the model over different periods for which adequate data are available. If the
changes in one of the trade policy variables (CTP) are significantly associated with the
performance variables with the expected sign, then it supports our hypothesis.
Growth performance variables (GP) are as follows:
n  labour productivity growth (GLP): Labour Productivity (LP) is defined as value-added
per worker at constant prices; GLP is growth in labour productivity expressed in natural
logarithms.
n  export growth (GEXP): GEXP is growth in exports at constant 1989 prices at the
branch level expressed in natural logarithms.
n  changes in price-cost margins (CPCM): Price Cost Margins (PCM) is defined as the
difference between value-added and wages in terms of output all at current prices
5;
CPCM is change in PCM in natural logarithms; a fall in this indicator reflects more
competitive pricing.
 
  Three different types of explanatory variables were used to explain the performance at the
four-digit branch level:
n  technology variables (TEC): We include four variables; capital-labour (KL) and labour-
output (LO) ratios per branch and indices of technology (INT) and scale (INS) per
branch. KL is defined as capital increment to wages in 1992/93; KL reflects capital
intensity in a branch. LO is defined as wages to output in 1992/93; LO reflects labour
intensity in a branch. INT is defined as the measure of the ratio of average labour
productivity in a branch to best-practice productivity in the branch in Australia; INT is to
reflect the range of technology used in a branch.  INS is defined as the ratio of average
output per establishment in a branch to the average output  in the largest-size category of
establishment in the branch; INS is to reflect the range of production scale in use in a
branch
6.
n  market structure variables (STR): Two structural variables are used; Output growth
(OG) and concentration ratio (CR). OG is defined as increase in output at constant
prices; this is to capture the effect of dynamic economies of scale - the  Verdoorn
relationship. The four-firm concentration ratio (CR) is used to reflect market conditions.8
Data on CR is available for a point in time (1992/93), so that changes in CR are not
used as an independent variable
7.
n  change in trade policy variables (CTP): We define  liberalisation as a reduction in
controls - licences, quotas and taxes - on foreign trade. To capture the liberalisation we
used four variables: change in effective rates of protection (CERP), change in average
tariffs (CAT), change in exports in total sales (CXS) and change in internal demand
(CIND). ERP is defined as domestic value-added to world value-added; a fall in ERP
over time at the branch level means increased trade liberalisation and is referred to as
CERP. CAT is defined as reduction in tariffs at constant prices; the average nominal
tariffs per branch divided by total tariffs in manufacturing. CXS is an export intensity
variable defined as change in exports in total sales at constant prices; reflecting external
demand. CIND is defined as change in internal demand at constant prices; total sales
less exports for each branch.  From the above measures, we focus on change in
effective protection (CERP) in detail, on the grounds that, provided protection estimates
are based on actual price comparisons rather than on schedule tariff rates, they are
supposed to capture the impact of both tariff and non-tariff restrictions on trade.
Table 2: Expected signs: Performance Indicators and Explanatory Variables
1
Explanatory variables Performance variables
GLP                   GEXP                   CPCM
Change in average tariffs (CAT) -                           -                              +
Change in effective protection (CERP) -                           -                              +
Change in internal demand (CIND) *                           -                             *
Index of technology (INT) -                           -                              +
Labor-output ratio (LO) -                           *                              *
Capital-labor ratio (KL) +                           -                              -
Index of scale (INS) -                           -                              +
Output growth (OG) +                          *                              *
4-firm concentration ratio (CR) -                           +                              +
Change in exports in sales (CXS) *                           +                             *
Note: * not included in our analysis.
As trade reforms promote productivity and export growth one can see a negative
relationship between these performance variables and reduction of tariffs (or effective
protection). As trade reforms reduce price-cost margins (this is used to reflect monopolistic
pricing) there will be a positive association between price-cost margins and reduction of
                                                                
1 Signs are based on neo-classical theory.9
tariffs (or effective protection).
Change in export share in total sales reflects export intensity. Changes in internal demand
reflect domestic intensity. The expectation is that export growth is determined by external
demand (CXS), competitiveness (CERP) and internal demand (CIND). One can expect a
negative relationship between growth in exports and internal demand as the lower is internal
demand the higher will be export growth. However, there will be a reversed sign if internal
demand is accompanied by improvements in productivity, intra-industry trade and
economies of scale.  We do expect a positive association between growth in exports and
changes in export share. However, there would be a negative relationship if firms are at an
initial level of export orientation, so that they find it difficult to increase exports.
Since higher capital intensity is likely to be associated with greater technical change, capital
intensive variables are positively associated with productivity growth. One would expect a
negative relationship between price-cost margins and capital intensity; the expectation is that
increases in margins will be difficult the higher is capital intensity, since for a given rate of
profit the margin required rises with capital intensity. Labour intensity is associated with
lower technical change and there will be a negative relationship between these variables and
productivity growth. If factor-intensity has an influence on export performance then the
expectation is that the capital-labour ratio will have a negative influence on exports.
Technology and scale indices are expected to be negatively associated with productivity
growth and positively associated with changes in price-cost margins. The low level of indices
reflects the scope for competition, as technologically backward or smaller firms catch up
with their technologically more advanced or larger rivals.
Since it is assumed that the Verdoorn relationship holds, one would expect a positive
relationship between output growth and productivity growth. The higher the concentration
the lower will be the extent of competition. Therefore, the expectation is that the
concentration ratio is negatively associated with productivity growth and positively
associated with the change in price-cost margins and exports.
Data relating to number of workers, wages, value-added, output and capital expenditure
have been obtained from surveys and censuses of ABS-Manufacturing industry of 1992/93,
1996/97. Value-added for 1996/97 has been obtained from ABS on request as this was not
available in the Annual Census 1996/97. The census and surveys cover all manufacturing
establishments in the states, government-owned business undertakings and private
establishments.10
The disaggregated figures of tariff rates, imports and exports of 1988/89, 1992/93 and
1996/97 have been used to compute CAT, CXS and IND at the ANZSIC 4 digit level;
these data have been obtained from ABS-Customs on request. The estimates of effective
rate of protection are available in ASIC four-digit classification published by the Industry
Commission; this is converted into ANZSIC classification for our purpose.
Results
We have analysed two alternative periods 1988/89-1992/93 and 1988/89-1996/97 and in
both cases the branch analysis is at the ANZSIC 4-digit level taking 151 observations. It is
expected that the first period captures the immediate impact of reforms of 1988/89 and the
latter capture the impact of reforms over time. In addition, we have  disaggregated the
sample into branches for which protection fell drastically. The liberaliser branches are from
textiles, clothing, footwear (ANZSIC 22) and machinery, equipment (ANZSIC 28). Also,
we have analysed the rest of the 104 branches. Our calculations are limited to data
constraints. We used the capital/labour ratio as one of the independent variables. Since we
do not have capital stock at the branch level, we used net capital expenditure to number of
workers at the branch level for the capital labor ratio calculations.
Table 3: Productivity results: (1988/90 - 1996/97)
GLP Sample size Constant CERP INT LO OG R
2 F
1 150 (All) -.081*** .-.204** .988*** -.69*** .035 .43 27.8***
2 45 (Liberalisers) -.166*** -.259* .72*** -.309** .318** .66 19.5***
3 104 (Others) -.096*** -.144 1.14*** -.844*** -.086 .44 21.9***
Note: *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level.
Table 3 indicates the productivity results for the period 1988/90-1996/97. Over this period
we find better results linking trade reforms and productivity performance, although the fit for
the equation for the entire branches is not very strong. As expected there was a negative but
weakly significant (at the 5% level) relationship between growth in labour productivity and
effective protection. The negative and significant relationship between labour intensity ratio
and labour productivity growth implies lower labour intensity is likely to be associated with
higher labour productivity. The index of technology variable is significant but with an
unexpected positive sign reflecting higher barriers to entry for new producers at the branch
level.
Among the liberalisers support for our argument is found in that the overall fit of the equation
improves, and for growth in labour productivity the trade policy variable is weakly significant
with the expected sign. Output growth in the liberaliser branches is positively and11
significantly related with labour productivity growth; reflecting the importance of dynamic
increasing returns. In these branches, lower labour intensity is associated with higher labour
productivity. As with the entire branches it is likely that there are higher barriers to entry for
new producers with liberalisation. For growth in labour productivity the effective rate of
protection is not significant in the rest of the branches. The Verdoorn relationship does not
exist in this sample.
Table 4: Export results: (1988/90 - 1996/97)
GEXP Sample size Constant CERP INS CXS CIND R
2 F
1 150 (All) .377*** -.215* .432** .138 .381** .11 4.7**
2 45 (Liberalisers) .233** -.509*** .465 .619*** .425 .38 7.9***
3 104 (Others) .398*** -.047 .457** .054 .384 .09 2.6
Note: *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level.
Table 4 shows the export results for the period 1988/90-1996/97. There tends to be a
negative and significant association (at the 10% level) between the growth in exports and
effective protection for the entire branches. The change in internal demand is significant but
with an unexpected positive sign reflecting the likely improvement in productivity and
involvement in intra-industry trade over this period. Higher the internal demand greater will
be growth in exports; reflects the improvement in productivity and intra-industry trade. For
this measure, index of scale is positively but highly significantly related with growth in exports
reflecting a high barrier to entry in the branch level; indicating lack of opportunities for the
technologically backward or small firms to catch up with their technologically advanced
rivals.
Among the liberalisers support for our argument is found in that the overall fit of the equation
improves, and for growth in exports the trade policy variable is highly significant (at the 1%
level) with the expected sign. We did not find support for the hypothesis in the rest of the
branches, in that the overall fit of the equations worsens. Among the liberalisers the change
in export share is positively and significantly related with export growth; reflecting the rising
external demand for the PMV and TCF products. Internal demand growth is positively
related with export growth but not significant. If this variable is significant, then the likely
implication is that the expansion in both the export market and domestic market lead to
higher export growth.12
Table 5: Price-cost margin results: (1988/90 - 1996/97)
CPCM Sample size Constant CERP INT KL GLP R
2 F
1 150 (All) -.182*** -.205* .523*** -.301** .19 11.2***
2 150 (All) -.049** .731*** .53 170.5***
Note: *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level.
Table 5 shows the price-cost margin results for the period 1988/90-1996/97. The change in
price-cost margins (CPCM) for this period suggest that the changes in effective protection
are weakly significant (at the 10% level), but with an unexpected negative sign. The lower
the effective protection the higher the price mark-ups. The implication is that productivity
gains are passed on to producers as higher profit margins. This productivity gain has not
passed on to consumers in lower prices. We can notice that change in the price-cost
margins is positively and significantly correlated with growth in labour productivity. The
implication is that rising import competition has failed to induce more competitive prices
8.
The change in price-cost margins is positively related with the capital-intensive variable and
negatively related with the index of technology as expected; both are highly significant.
Over the shorter period no support is found for the trade liberalisation and performance
hypothesis. A change in the average tariff is negatively related with growth in productivity as
expected but is not significant. Also changes in effective protection is negatively related with
labour productivity growth but not significantly. Our result does not capture the short-term
impact of reform. Growth in labour productivity is positively and significantly (at the 1%
level) related with output growth. This means that the productivity response is greater the
higher is the degree of reform for the branch concerned for a given rate of output growth.
Over the shorter period, the negative and significant association between the capital/labour
ratio and productivity is unexpected. This reveals that lower capital intensity is likely to be
associated with greater technical change. As with the longer period, growth in exports is
positively and significantly related to the concentration ratio and index of scale. Internal
demand is positively and significantly (at the 10% level) related with export growth in the
other model. Selected equations for this period are given in the Appendix.
Conclusions
We do find a weak relationship between trade reform and labour productivity growth for the
period 1988-1997, although we cannot establish any relationship in the short-run. We can
note the similarity between our results and that of Chand (1997) for Australia. He concludes
that a one per cent decline in the nominal protection rates leads to between a 0.18 and 0.56
per cent gain in multi-factor productivity between 1967/68 and 1994/95. Our results show
that the association is stronger among the liberalising branches and this tends to indicate13
resource  reallocation in response to removal of quota and removal of tariffs in the
traditionally protected TCF and PMV sectors. Trade reforms do appear to have an indirect
influence on productivity via its output growth and this is true among liberalisers and among
the short-run sample. In the longer period, lower labour intensity is associated with higher
labour productivity; this is true among liberalisers.
In the short-run, we obtained an unexpected negative association between capital intensity
and labour productivity growth. We can note some link between our short-run results and
those of Dixon and McDonald (1993) for Australia. They found that most sectors in the
economy appeared to be working with a capital labour ratio considerably in excess of the
ratio dictated by relative factor prices and therefore they conclude that the recovery in
business capital formation may be slow between 1986/87 and 1990/91. Further they argue
that the changes in protection had relatively little impact on the economy. Our results reflect
these factors unambiguously during the short period.
Improvements in productivity and competitiveness can lead to improvement in export
performance. Our analysis of data on export performance over a period 1988-97
establishes a link between price competitiveness and greater exports. This link is stronger
among the liberalising branches and we can interpret it as the result of long-run price
competitiveness in response to removal of protection between 1988-97. For the entire
branches internal demand and for the liberalisers export market share are the determining
forces. We assume that the technology diversity ratios reflect a higher barrier to entry in the
branch level and there is lack of opportunities for the technologically backward or small
firms to catch up with their technologically advanced rivals.
There is no support for our “import discipline” hypothesis which says that the monopolistic
domestic producers would be forced to lower their prices as a result of external
competition. The implication is that the positive productivity growth does not seem to have
an effect on lower prices. There may be some element of monopoly at work in Australia
which is reflected through the measures of  liberalisation, in this case effective protection
estimates, that we used in this analysis. We assume that the effective protection estimates
reflect the pricing policy of distributors and there is a slow reduction in this ratio over time.
In brief, this sort of analysis rarely gives conclusive results but the results indicate some
support for the hypotheses that falling protection is associated with rising productivity and
rising exports at the branch level; so that the greater liberalisers tend to show better
performance. As we noted the association and the explanatory power of the equations is
weak. The model needs to be developed further to capture the other factors which may14
influence the relationship.15
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Appendix 1: Selected Regression results: 1988/9-1992/93
GP Constant ERP CAT OG INS KL GLP LO CR CIND R
2 F
GLP .004*** -.045 .388*** -.274*** .21 12.9***
GLP .004*** -.038 .389*** -.266*** .21 12.9***
CPCM .003* .024 .719*** -.278*** .65 91.1***
GEXP .116 -.173 .285** -.223* .302*** .18 7.9***
GEXP .248*** -.134 .485*** .352* .10 5.3**
Note: *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level.
Variables as defined in the text.17
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increase in manufacturing exports among the group of trade policy reformer countries compared to
non-reformers.
3  See Jayanthakumaran, 1996/7 for a detailed survey of these issues.
4 Reforms were initiated: public sector reforms related to pricing, structure and ownership; labour
market reforms related to labour market arrangements including restructuring the industrial relations
system, enterprise bargaining and vocational education and training program; environmental
management reforms related to implementing economic instruments for achieving environmental







 where V is value-added, W is wages, and O is output, all at current prices. V is
estimated as V = O - M. Where M is material inputs (excluding capital charges).
6  All technology variables are computed for a single year on the grounds that any changes in these
variables will be long-term and will not affect short-term performance. For our purpose we used the
capital/labour ratio for the period 1992/3 and technology ratio for the period 1996/7. Comparable data
for the capital/labour ratio is not available thereafter.
7  We estimated concentration ratios for the four digit level by using available two digit level estimates.
8  Similar results have been obtained in Chile by de Melo and Urata (1984) and in Sri Lanka  by Weiss
and Jayanthakumaran (1995). Both of these studies conclude that this unexpected result is due to
continued monopolistic control over the distribution sector; higher price mark-ups imposed by
distributors result in higher mark-ups by local producers of import-competing goods.